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INTRODUCTION: GOVERNING CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly* 
lobalization challenges an array of international actors to confront 
myriad problems. Increasingly, non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) take up this challenge by themselves or in coordination with 
other actors. Governing Civil Society: NGO Accountability, Legitimacy 
and Influence brought together prominent scholars and experts in a range 
of subject matters and disciplines to address how improving NGOs as 
institutions relates to the legitimacy of their role in civil society. NGO 
scholars consider the legitimacy of NGO action on the ground, among 
the constituencies affected by their efforts as they operate within interna-
tional institutions that make law. Nonprofit law scholars address similar 
issues, but often focus on the internal workings and external regulation of 
NGOs and how their missions can be accomplished most accountably 
and effectively. This symposium brought together these disparate, but 
linked, disciplines for an important conversation on enhancing these es-
sential institutions. 
Our first panel, Assessing the Influence of NGOs on International Or-
ganizations confronted the work of NGOs in International Organizations 
(“IOs”). In The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations: Com-
plexities and Considerations, Professor Shamima Ahmed notes the per-
ception that nonprofits are succeeding in connection with their work ei-
ther on the ground or in IOs, but also questions the lack of rigorous 
scholarship regarding NGOs’ impact. Admittedly, examining this impact 
will be complex. Any examination should consider whether the NGO 
made the norm making process more accessible or democratic and 
whether the NGO succeeded in changing the status quo. Any framework 
that measures NGO impact also should consider structural and contextual 
factors. The size, nature of issues, scope of operations, political oppor-
tunity structure, and the ability of the NGO to speak with one voice all 
affect NGOs’ impact. The subject matter that an NGO addresses (e.g. 
technical matters) also affects how we measure an NGO’s impact. Pro-
fessor Shamima’s article guides us through three case studies that illus-
trate these factors, confirming the claim that NGO impact is complex and 
the need for further study. 
In “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global 
Civil Society and the United Nations, Kenneth Anderson calls attention 
to the danger that the self-legitimizing relationships between IOs and 
NGOs presents to accountability. Examining external accountability, he 
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considers whether “international NGOs, and transborder social move-
ments more generally, have any special governance role to play.” 1 After 
tracking the evolution of NGOs pre- and post-9/11, he distinguishes be-
tween civil society having a role to play as experts versus as representa-
tives. He argues that NGOs should embrace a role as experts and “even 
as enthusiasts and advocates for their causes”2 and forego claims to rep-
resent anyone. 
In The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, Steve Char-
novitz constructs three frames by which we may view NGO participation 
in international organizations: State positivism, IO functionalism, and 
community. The State positivism frame would limit the NGO participa-
tion in IOs to that specifically provided by the states that establish the IO. 
Under the functional view, it is the IO that would consult NGOs as it 
deemed appropriate. He notes that NGO participation may have its costs, 
but from a functional standpoint it should also promote “the long-term 
effectiveness of the IO.” 3 The community frame views the IO as “a place 
where a community of actors debates and makes decisions.” 4 This com-
munity has the individual, not the state, at its center. Each framework 
suggests a different answer to the question posed by Professor Char-
novitz: whether it is illegitimate to exclude NGOs from IOs. The positive 
view would leave the question up to the member states (although a mi-
nority view of the positive approach would impose some limitations on 
the state’s ability to exclude NGOs). The functionalist approach sees the 
IO as having a personality and defers to each IO to decide if NGO in-
volvement would “promote the IO’s purposes.”5  The community ap-
proach sees the IO as a community, of which NGOs must be a part. 
Professor Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer’s NGO Standing and Influence in In-
ternational Human Rights Courts and Commissions examines NGO in-
volvement in the development and implementation of international hu-
man rights law. He undertakes regional analysis considering Europe, the 
Americas, and Africa. First, he examines the existing provisions for 
NGO involvement in the human rights courts in each region. NGOs play 
a variety of roles from applicants, to counsel, to intervenors. Professor 
Hitoshi Mayer then undertakes an analysis of these roles by reviewing 
tribunal decisions from these systems over a ten year period. After con-
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Kenneth Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, 
Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 845 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 888. 
 3. Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 891, 902 (2011). 
 4. Id. at 904. 
 5. Id. at 910. 
2011] INTRODUCTION 815 
sidering the differences and similarities among the three systems, he then 
considers the ramifications of NGO involvement. Ultimately he con-
cludes that “the development and support of human rights NGOs should 
[] be targeted in different ways in these different systems.” 6 He also ex-
amines NGO accountability in the regional human rights enforcement 
system. Admittedly, there are relatively few NGOs who are given a dis-
proportionate role in the process. Nevertheless, he finds that there is 
“significant oversight” from “reputable individuals and groups from both 
within and outside the relevant member states.” 7 
The second panel of the day considered Models for Governance and 
Regulation of NGOs. In her paper Through the Looking Glass: European 
Perspectives on Non-profit Vulnerability, Legitimacy and Regulation, 
Oonagh B. Breen looks at the regulation of nonprofits through a Europe-
an lens. First, Professor Breen outlines EU Regulation and considers the 
evolution of European policy. She recounts how the events of 9/11 trig-
gered concern over nonprofit finances, leading to the Financial Action 
Task Force (“FATF”)–Special Recommendation VIII, focusing on the 
activities of nonprofits, Member State implementation of the FATF rec-
ommendations, and the European Commission’s 2005 Communication 
on the Prevention of and Fight Against Terrorist Financing through En-
hanced National Level Coordination and Greater Transparency of the 
Non-profit Sector. Three important reports issued between 2007 and 
2009 caused the EU to re-assess its strategy and consider a more contex-
tual approach that took account of empirical evidence, proportionality, as 
well as sensitivity to national regimes and needed flexibility for humani-
tarian organizations. She argues, in conclusion, for a more balanced ap-
proach that would “focus on improving non-profit governance in those 
areas that raise concern at EU level or that may particularly benefit from 
a concerted European (as opposed to an ad hoc Member State) policy 
solution.”8 
In Wait! That’s Not What We Meant By Civil Society: Questioning The 
NGO Orthodoxy In West Africa, Thomas A. Kelley looks at NGOs on the 
ground and in particular, development organizations’ efforts to promote 
civil society in Africa and in particular West Africa. Starting from the 
premise that a stable civil society fosters democratic governance, stabil-
ity and prosperity, international development workers sought to engender 
civil society. As he explains, “the aid industry presumed a causal connec-
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tion between a thriving civil society, democratization, and economic 
prosperity.”9 Most northern or donor countries envision that civil society 
in developing countries would look much as it does in those donor coun-
tries. But as Kelley points out, the experience in West Africa has shown 
that while law reformers might be successful in creating a space for civil 
society, they cannot dictate the inhabitants of that space. In West Africa, 
Muslim social reformers have stepped into the space and espoused their 
own beliefs and traditions. Professor Kelley concludes “that there is little 
that western governments and aid organizations can do to prevent the 
civil society sphere in West Africa from evolving in its own direction.”10 
We were honored to present our Linking NGO Accountability and the 
Legitimacy of Global Governance for discussion in the symposium’s fi-
nal panel. In it, we consider how global regulators can help improve 
NGO accountability as well as the legitimacy of global regulation. After 
considering the roles the NGOs play in global governance, the article 
describes the various legitimacy frameworks used to assess IOs and how 
NGO involvement plays an important role in them. It then reviews NGO 
accountability regimes supplied by domestic nonprofit law and reveals 
that these regimes will fall short in ensuring legitimacy for NGOs efforts 
internationally. Next, the article evaluates the accreditation, monitoring, 
and enforcement efforts IOs use to ensure and maintain the accountabil-
ity of the NGOs upon whom they rely. Ultimately, we argue for im-
provements in these systems, to improve the legitimacy of NGO partici-
pation and allow global regulators to better “serve as gatekeepers and [] 
better utilize NGOs as part of their legitimacy strategies.”11 
Governing Civil Society: NGO Accountability, Legitimacy and Influ-
ence made a valuable contribution to encouraging the dialogue between 
NGO and nonprofit legal scholars. As NGOs continue to play a signifi-
cant role within and among States and IOs, this critical conversation and 
the research it has spurred will no doubt continue. We thank the scholars 
whose work appears in these pages, as well as the other panelists and 
participants at the symposium, for their efforts. 
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